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ZebraLancer: Crowdsource Knowledge atop
Open Blockchain, Privately and Anonymously
Yuan Lu, Qiang Tang and Guiling Wang
Abstract—We design and implement the first private and anonymous decentralized crowdsourcing system ZebraLancer, and
overcome two fundamental challenges of decentralizing crowdsourcing, i.e. data leakage and identity breach.
First, our outsource-then-prove methodology resolves the tension between blockchain transparency and data confidentiality, which are
critical for the basic utilities of data crowdsourcing. ZebraLancer ensures: (i) a requester will not pay more than what data deserve,
according to a policy announced when her task is published via the blockchain; (ii) each worker indeed gets a payment based on the
policy, if he submits data to the blockchain; (iii) the above properties are realized not only without a central arbiter, but also without
leaking the data to the open blockchain. Second, the transparency of blockchain allows one to infer private information about workers
and requesters through their participation history. On the other hand, allowing anonymity will enable a malicious worker to submit
multiple times to reap rewards. ZebraLancer overcomes this problem by allowing anonymous requests/submissions without sacrificing
the accountability. The idea behind is a subtle linkability: if a worker submits twice to a task, anyone can link the submissions, or else
he stays anonymous and unlinkable across tasks. To realize this delicate linkability, we put forward a novel cryptographic concept, i.e.
the common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication. We remark the new anonymous authentication scheme might be of
independent interest. Finally, we implement our protocol for a common image annotation task and deploy it in a test net of Ethereum.
The experiment results show the applicability of our protocol atop the existing real-world blockchain.
Index Terms—Blockchain, crowdsourcing, confidentiality, anonymity, accountability.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing empowers open collaboration over the
Internet. One remarkable example is the solicitation of an-
notated data: the benchmark of famous ImageNet challenge
[1] was created via Amazon’s crowdsourcing marketplace,
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [2]. Another notable example is
mobile crowdsensing [3] where one (called “requester”) can
request a group of individuals (called “workers”) to use
mobile devices to gather information fostering data-driven
applications [4, 5]. Various monetary incentive mechanisms
were introduced [6–12] to motivate workers to make real
efforts. To facilitate these mechanisms, the state-of-the-art
solution necessarily requires a trusted third-party to host
crowdsourcing tasks to fulfill the fair exchange between the
crowd-shared data and the rewards; otherwise, the effec-
tiveness of incentive mechanisms can be hindered by the
so-called “free-riding” (i.e. dishonest workers reap rewards
without making real efforts) and “false-reporting” (i.e. dis-
honest requesters try to repudiate the payment).
It is well-known that the reduction of the reliance on
a trusted third-party is desirable in practice, and the same
goes for the case of crowdsourcing. First, numerous real-
world incidents reveal that the party might silently mis-
behave in-house for self-interests [13]; or, some of its em-
ployees [14] or attackers [15] can compromise its function-
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ality. Second, the party often fails to resolve disputes. For
instance, requesters have a good chance to collect data
without paying at MTurk, because the platform is biased
on requesters over workers [16]. Third, a centralized plat-
form inevitably inherits all the vulnerabilities of the single
point failure. For example, Waze, a crowdsourcing map app,
suffered from 3 unexpected server downs and 11 scheduled
service outages during 2010-2013 [4]. Last but not least, a
central platform hosting all tasks also increases the worry
of massive privacy breach. A most fresh lesson to us is the
tremendous data leakage of Uber [17].
In contrast, an open blockchain1 is a distributed, trans-
parent and immutable “bulletin board” organized as a
chain of blocks. It is usually managed and replicated by
a peer-to-peer (P2P) network collectively. Each block will
include some messages committed by network peers, and
be validated by the whole network according to a pre-
defined consensus protocol. This ensures reliable message
deliveries via the untrusted Internet. More interestingly, the
messages contained in each block can be program code,
the execution of which is enforced and verified by all P2P
network peers; hence, a more exotic application of smart
contract [18] is enabled. Essentially, the smart contract can
be viewed as a “decentralized computer” that faithfully
handles all computations and message deliveries related to
a specified task. It becomes enticing to build a decentralized
crowdsourcing platform atop.
1 We remark that blockchain is used to refer open blockchain
through this paper. An open/permissionless/public blockchain is a
blockchain network that allows any party to participate and leave,
as opposed to a less ambitious way of building blockchain atop per-
missioned parties. ZebraLancer can inherit the P2P network of open
blockchain as the underlying infrastructure.
2Unfortunately, this new fascinating technology also
brings about new privacy challenges [19], which were never
that severe in the centralized setting before and could even
harm the basic system utilities, as one notable feature of the
blockchain is its transparency. The whole chain is replicated
to the whole network to ensure consistency, thus the data
submitted to the blockchain will be visible to the public.
First, the blockchain transparency causes an immediate
problem violating data privacy, considering that many of
the crowdsourced data maybe sensitive. For example, even
in the intuitively “safe” image annotation tasks, if there are
some special ambiguous pictures (e.g. Thematic Appercep-
tion Test pictures [20]), the answers to them can be used
to infer the personality profiles of workers. Sometimes, the
data are simply valuable to the requester who paid to get
them. What is worse, since the block confirmation (which
corresponds to the time when the submitted answers are
actually recorded in a block) normally takes some time after
the data is submitted to the network, a malicious worker
can simply copy the data committed by others, and submit
the same data as his own to run the free-riding attack.
Without data confidentiality, the incentive mechanisms could
be rendered completely ineffective in decentralized settings.
Second, most crowdsourcing systems [2, 4] and incentive
mechanisms [7–9] implicitly require requesters/workers to
authenticate to prevent misbehaviors caused by (colluded)
counterfeited identities [21]. When crowdsourcing is decen-
tralized, this basic requirement will cause the history of
submitting/requesting to be known by everyone (which
was previously “protected” in a data center such as the
breached one of Uber’s). Thus considerable information
about workers/requesters [22] will leak to the public through
their participation history, which seriously impairs their
privacy and even demotivates them to join. Notably, if a
user frequently joins traffic monitoring tasks, then anyone
can read the blockchain and figure out his location traces.
Clearly, to decentralize crowdsourcing in a meaningful
way to realize basic system utilities, the above fundamental
privacy challenges have to be overcome, which requires us
to resolve two natural tensions: (i) the tension between the
blockchain transparency and the data confidentiality, and
(ii) the tension between the anonymity and the accountabil-
ity. Simple solutions utilizing some standard cryptographic
tools (e.g. encryption and/or group signature) to protect
the data confidentiality and the anonymity do not work
well: the encryption of data immediately prevents smart
contracts from enforcing the rewards policy; to allow fully
anonymous participation will give a dishonest worker an
opportunity of multiple submissions in one crowdsourcing
task, and thus he may claim more rewards than what is
supposed (similarly for a malicious requester). See more
details about the challenges in Section 2.
Our contributions. In this paper, we construct, analyze
and implement a general blockchain based protocol to
enable the first private and anonymous decentralized data
crowdsourcing system2. Without relying on any third-party
information arbiter, our protocol can still guarantee the
faithful execution for a class of incentive mechanisms,
once they are announced as pre-specified policies in the
blockchain. More importantly, we also protect confidential
data and identities from the blockchain network, while the
underlying blockchain is auditing the correct execution of
crowdsourcing tasks. Specifically,
1) A blockchain based protocol is proposed to realize
decentralized crowdsourcing that satisfies: (i) the fair
exchange between data and rewards, i.e., a worker
will be paid the correct amount according to the pre-
defined policy of evaluating data, if he submits to the
blockchain; (ii) data confidentiality, i.e., the submitted
data is confidential to anyone other than the requester;
and (iii) anonymity and accountability.
Intuition behind the fairness and confidentiality is an
outsource-then-prove methodology that: (i) the requester
is enforced to deposit the budget of her incentive pol-
icy to a smart contract; (ii) submissions are encrypted
under the requester’s public key and will be collected
by the blockchain; (iii) the evaluation of rewards is
outsourced to the requester who then needs to send an
instruction about how to reward workers. The instruc-
tion is ensured to follow the promised incentive policy,
because the requester is also required to attach a valid
succinct zero-knowledge proof.
The worker anonymity of our protocol can ensure: (i)
the public, including the requester and the implicit
registration authority, is not able to tell whether a data
comes from a given worker or not; (ii) if a worker
joins multiple tasks announced via the blockchain, no
one can link these tasks. More importantly, we also
address the threat of multiple-submission exacerbated
by anonymity misuse. In particular, if a worker anony-
mously submits more than the number allowed in one
task, our scheme allows the blockchain to tell and drop
these invalid submissions. Similarly, we achieve the
requesters’ accountable anonymity.
2) To achieve the above goal of anonymity while preserv-
ing accountability, we propose, define and construct
a new cryptographic primitive, called common-prefix-
linkable anonymous authentication. In most of the time,
a user can authenticate messages and attest the validity
of identity without being linked. The only exception
that anyone can link two authenticated messages is that
they share the same prefix and are authenticated by one
user.
To utilize the new primitive in our protocol, a worker
has to submit to a task via an anonymous authen-
tication. The reference of the task will be unique,
and should be the common-prefix, so that the special
linkability will prevent multi-submission to a task. A
requester can also use it to authenticate in each task
she publishes, and convince workers that she cannot
2A couple of recent attempts on decentralized crowdsourcing [23]
have been made, however, none resolved the fundamental privacy
issues, which are quite arguable for basic functionalities, as in these
systems, malicious workers can simply free-ride by copying other
submissions. See Section 3 for the detailed insufficiencies.
3maliciously submit to intentionally downgrade their
rewards. We remark that such a scheme can be used
to anonymously authenticate in a constant time inde-
pendent to tasks.
Such a primitive may be of independent interests for
the special flavor of its accountability-yet-anonymity.
3) To showcase the feasibility of applying our protocol,
we implement the system that we call ZebraLancer for
a common image annotation task on top of Ethereum,
a real-world blockchain infrastructure. Intensive exper-
iments and performance evaluations are conducted in
a Ethereum test net. Since current smart contracts sup-
port only primitive operations, tailoring such protocols
compatible with existing blockchain platforms is non-
trivial.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will give more precise definitions about
the problem and its security requirements.
TABLE 1
Key notations related to crowdsourcing model
Notation Represent for
R A requester that can be uniquely identified by ID R
Wj A worker who can be uniquely identified by IDWi
T
The crowdsourcing task published by R to collect n
answers from n different workers
Aj The answer that is submitted to T byWj
R(Aj ; τ) The process that defines the value of the answer Aj
Rj The reward for answer Aj according to its value
Data crowdsourcing model. As illustrated in Fig.1, there
are four roles in the model of data crowdsourcing, i.e.,
requesters, workers, a platform and a registration authority.
A requester, uniquely identified by R, can post a task to
collect a certain amount of answers from the crowd. When
announcing the task, the requester promises a concrete re-
ward policy to incentivize workers to contribute (see details
about the definition of reward policy below). A worker with
a unique ID Wj , submits his answer Aj and expects to
receive the corresponding reward. The platform, a medium
assisting the exchange between requesters and workers, is
either a trusted party or emulated by a network of peers. The
platform considered in this paper is jointly maintained by a
collection of network peers, and in particular, we will build
it atop a open blockchain network. The registration authority
(RA), can play an important role of verifying and managing
unique identities of workers/requesters, by binding each
identity to a unique credential (e.g. a digital certificate). Note
that an answer Aj is chosen from a well-defined setA.
We remark that the well established identities are nec-
essary demand of real-world crowdsourcing systems, for
example MTurk and Waze, to prevent misbehaviors such
as Sybil attack. Moreover, many auction-based incentive
mechanisms [8, 9] are built upon the non-collusive game
theory that implicitly requires established identities to en-
sure one bid from one unique ID. We employ RA to establish
Fig. 1. The model of data crowdsourcing: workers and requesters obtain
unique credentials bound to their identities at a registration authority
(RA); authenticated requesters and authenticated workers can make
fair exchange between data and rewards through a third-party platform
(arbiter).
identities. In practice, a RA can be instantiated by (i) the
platform itself, (ii) the certificate authority who provides
authentication service, or (iii) the hardware manufacturer
who makes trusted devices that can faithfully sign messages
[24]. Our solution should be able to inherit these established
RAs in the real-world.
In this paper, w.l.o.g., we assume that each unique iden-
tity is only allowed to submit one answer to a task. Also, we
consider settings where the value of crowd-shared answers
can be evaluated by a well-defined process such as auctions
and quality-aware rewards, and also the corresponding
rewards, c.f. [10–12] about quality-aware rewards and [8, 9]
about auction-based incentives. These incentives share the
same essence as follows.
Suppose an authenticated requester publishes a task T
with a budget τ to collect n answers from n workers. An
authenticatedworker interested in it will then submit his an-
swers. The reward of an answerAj will follow a well-defined
process determined by some auxiliary variables, i.e., the
reward of Aj can be defined as Rj := R(Aj ; a1, . . . , am, τ),
where R is a function parameterized by some auxiliary
variables denoted by a1, . . . , am, τ . Remark that τ is the
budget of the requester, and we will use Rj := R(Aj ; τ)
for short.
Particularly, in some simple tasks (e.g. multiple choice
problems), the quality of an answer can be straightfor-
wardly evaluated by all answers to the same task, i.e.
Rj = R(Aj ;A1, . . . , An, τ), with using majority voting or
estimation maximization iterations [10–12]. More generally,
[25] proposed a universal method to evaluate quality: (i)
some workers are requested to answer a complex task;
(ii) other different workers are then requested to grade
each answer collected in the previous stage. What’s more,
our model captures the essence of auction-based incentive
mechanism such as [8, 9], when the parameters a1, . . . , am
represent the bids of workers (and other necessary auxiliary
inputs such as their reputation scores).
Our work considers the general definition above and
will be extendable to the scope of auction-based incentives,
even though the protocol design and implementations in
this paper mainly focus on how to instantiate quality-aware
incentives. Also note that the flat-rate incentive, that is each
4submitted answer will get a flat-rate payment [2], can be
considered as a special case of the above abstraction as well.
Security models.Next, we specify the basic security require-
ments for our (decentralized) crowdsourcing system on top
of the existing infrastructure of open blockchain.
Data confidentiality. Ideally, this property requires that
the communication transcripts (including the blocks in the
blockchain) do not leak anything to anyone (except the
requester) about the input parameters a1, . . . , am of the in-
centive policy R. Because these parameters might actually be
confidential data or sealed bids. We can adapt the classical
semantic security [26] style definition from cryptography
for this ideal purpose: the distribution of the public com-
munication can be simulated with only public knowledge.
However, an adversarial worker can infer information after
receiving his payment. This is the inherent issue of incentive
mechanisms, and cannot be resolved even if there is a fully
trusted third-party. So our protocol will focus on the best-
possible data confidentiality, as if there is a fully trusted
party. Informally speaking, our protocol is running in the
“real” world, and imagine there is an “ideal” world where
exists a fully trusted party facilitating the incentives; by real-
ideal world paradigm, our data confidentiality requires that
the two worlds are computationally indistinguishable.
Anonymity. Private information of worker/requester can
be explored by linking tasks they join/publish [22]. In-
tuitively, we might require two anonymity properties for
workers: (i) unlinkability between a submission and a particular
worker and (ii) unlinkability among all tasks joined by a par-
ticular worker. However, (i) indeed can be implied by (ii),
because the break of first one can obviously lead up to the
break of the latter one. Similarly, the anonymity of requester
can be understood as the unlinkability among all tasks
published by her. The requirement of worker anonymity
can be formulated via the following game. An adversary
A corrupts a requester, the registration authority (RA), and
the platform (e.g. the blockchain); suppose there are only
two honest workers, W0 and W1. In the beginning, the
adversary announces a number of n tasks. For each task
Ti, suppose there are a set of participating workers WTi .
After seeing all the communications, for any Ti 6= Tj , A
cannot tell whether WTi ∩WTj = ∅ better than guessing.
We note that the anonymity should hold even if all entities,
including the requester and the platform (except W0 and
W1), are corrupted. The requester anonymity can be defined
via the above game similarly, and we omit the details.
Security against a malicious requester. A malicious re-
quester may avoid paying rewards (defined by the policy
R), e.g. launches the false-reporting attack. Security in this
case can be formulated via the following security game:
an adversary A corrupts the requester and executes the
protocol to publish a task with a promised reward policy R
and a budget τ . Let us define a bad eventB1 to be that there
exists a worker Wj , who submits answers Aj and receives
a payment smaller than Rj = R(Aj ; τ). We require that for
every polynomial time adversary A, the probability Pr[B1]
is negligibly small.
Security against malicious workers. A dishonest worker
may try to harvest more rewards than what he deserves.
Security in this case can be formulated as follows. An
adversary A corrupts one worker,3 and participates in the
protocol interacting with a requester (and the platform):
(i) A submits some answers {A1, . . . , An}, n ≥ 1, let us
define the bad event B2 as that A receives a payment
greater than max{Aj∈{A1,...,An}}Rj := R(Aj ; τ) from the
requester; (ii) A also sees the transcripts corresponding to
an honest worker Wi’s submission (e.g. the ciphertext of
Ai), and then submits her answer Aj to the platform, let
us define the bad event B3 as that A receives a payment
Rj = R(Ai; τ). We require that for all polynomial time A,
Pr[B2] and Pr[B3] − Pr[(AA ← A) = Ai] are negligibly
small.
We remark that the above securities against a malicious
requester and malicious workers have captured the special
fairness of the exchange between crowd-shared data and
rewards. For example, Sybil attackers who forge identities,
and front-running attackers who copy and paste others’
submissions (which can be either ciphertexts or plaintexts)
shall be prevented.
Technical challenges. The main advantage that the
blockchain offers is the smart contract that can be auto-
matically executed as a piece of pre-defined agreement. Let
us firstly look at a naive decentralized solution to a crowd-
sourcing task: the requester codes her incentive policy into a
task’s smart contract C , and then broadcasts the contract C
to the blockchain network to collect n answers; the incentive
policy is using an incentive mechanism defined by a func-
tion R and a budget τ ; after the contract C is included by a
block, it can expect workers submit answers to it in the clear;
finally, C can evaluate the reward Ri = R(Ai;A1, . . . , A,τ)
for each answer Ai; more importantly, the contract can
further automatically transfer Ri to the blockchain address
bound to answer Ai.
The above naive solution looks appealing to resolve the
fairness issues such as free-riding and false-reporting. Notice
that an implicit requirement is that answers (or bids) should
be submitted in the clear, as the contract needs all those
as the inputs (i.e. a1, . . . , am) of incentive policy R to audit
the right amount of the reward for each answer. However,
those inputs can be valuable and sensitive crowd-shared
answers, and should be kept confidential. Or they could be
auction bids, and should be confidential as well, because a
malicious worker can learn the distribution of truthful bids
of honest workers, and further break auctions by crafting
optimized malicious (untruthful) bids. One may suggest
that a worker encrypts his answer (or his bid) under the
requester’s public key, and submits the ciphertext instead.
Unfortunately, this immediately renders the above naive so-
lution to fail, as the contract (more precisely, the blockchain
peer) only sees ciphertexts and thus cannot evaluate the
reward. Another proposal to hardcode the secret key in
the smart contract also fails, as the secret key will become
transparent. Also remark that more advanced encryption
schemes such as fully homomorphic encryption do not help,
3We remark that we focus on resolving the new challenges intro-
duced by blockchain, and put forth the best possible security, as if there
is a fully trusted third-party serving as the crowdsourcing platform.
For example, it is not quite clear how to handle the collusion of many
identities, even in the centralized setting; thus such a problem is out of
the scope of this paper.
5because the blockchain peers still cannot know the plaintext
of rewards without the secret key, even if they can compute
the ciphertext of rewards. Therefore, the tension between the
data confidentiality and the transparent execution of smart
contracts brings in our first challenge:
Challenge 1. Leveraging the blockchain to enforce incentives,
but not revealing the confidential inputs of incentive mechanism
(e.g. answers or bids) to the public.
As briefly pointed out in the introduction, when the
anonymity of workers/requesters is not protected well,
their private information can be hampered, because the
participation history of tasks will leak to the public through
the blockchain. What’s worse, negative payoffs will be
added to decrease the motivations of workers/requesters
to participate, due to their breached privacy. To mitigate
the risk of privacy breach, one might suggest anonymous
submission/request. However, if a worker is allowed to
submit data without authenticating his unique identity, a
malicious one may exploit this to flood a task by multiple
submissions. In particular, a requester specifies a task to
collect 20 answers from 20 anonymous workers, and a mali-
cious worker might submit 20 colluded answers with claim-
ing that they are from 20 different workers, as all answers
are anonymously submitted. Worse still, an anonymous
requester might send (colluded) answers to her own task to
repudiate payments. For instance, a requester anonymously
publishes a task to collect 50 answers, and she submits
30 colluded anonymous answers to downgrade other 20
answers, such that she avoids paying but still gets 20 useful
answers. These scenarios cause another tension between
the participants anonymity and their accountability, which
brings in the second challenge:
Challenge 2. Ensuring participants to be anonymous while
keeping their accountability in decentralized crowdsourcing.
3 RELATED WORK
We thoroughly review related works, and briefly discuss the
insufficiencies of the state-of-the-art solutions.
Centralized crowdsourcing systems. MTurk [2] is the most
commercially successful crowdsourcing platform. But it
has a well-know vulnerability allowing false-reporters gain
short-term advantage [16]. Also, MTurk collects plaintexts of
answers, which causes considerable worry of data leakage.
Last, the pseudo IDs in MTurks can be trivially linked by a
malicious requester. Dynamo [27] was designed as a privacy
wrapper of MTurk. Its pseudo ID can only be linked by the
pseudo ID issuer, but still it inherited all other weaknesses of
MTurk. SPPEAR [28] considered a couple of privacy issues
in data crowdsourcing, and thus introduced a couple more
authorities, each of which handled a different functionality.
Distributing one authority into multiple reduces the exces-
sive trust, but, unfortunately, it is still not clear how to
instantiate all those different authorities in practice.
Decentralized crowdsourcing. We also note there are sev-
eral attempts [23, 29–31] using blockchain to decentralize
crowdsourcing, but neither of them considers privacy and
anonymity which are arguably fundamental for basic utility:
the authors of [29] built up a crowd-shared service on top
of the blockchain, but the system is not compatible with
incentive mechanisms and is not privacy-preserving either;
the authors of [30] leveraged the blockchain as a payment
channel in their crowdsourcing framework, but it is neither
secure against malicious workers and dishonest requesters,
nor privacy-preserving; a couple of recent attempts [23, 31]
took advantage of the public blockchain to enforce incen-
tives, but these frameworks are neither private nor anony-
mous, i.e., the collected data and the unique identities (such
as certificates) will leak to the whole network of the open
blockchain.
Anonymous crowdsourcing. Li and Cao [32] proposed
a framework to allow workers generate their own
pseudonyms based on their device IDs. But the protocol
sacrificed the accountability of workers, because workers
can forge pseudonyms without attesting that they are asso-
ciated to real IDs, which gave a malicious worker chances to
forge fake pseudo IDs and cheat for rewards. Rahaman et al.
[33] proposed an anonymous-yet-accountable protocol for
crowdsourcing based on group signature, and focused on
how to revoke the anonymity of misbehaved workers. Mis-
behaved workers could be identified and further revoked
by the group manager. The authors in [28] similarly relied
on group signature but introduced a couple of separate
authorities. Our solution can be considered as a proactive
version that can prevent worker misbehavior, and without
relying on a group manager.
Accountable anonymous authentication. The pioneering
works in anonymous e-cash [34, 35] firstly proposed the
notion of one-time anonymous authentication. The concept
later was studied in the context of one-show anonymous
credential [36]. Some works [37, 38] further extended the
notion of one-time use to be k-time use, and therefore
enabled a more general accountability for anonymous au-
thentications. In [39], the authors considered a special flavor
of accountability to periodically allow k-time anonymous
authentications.
Our new primitive provides a more fine-grained con-
ditional linkage of anonymous authentications, which is
needed for preventing multi-submission in each crowd-
sourcing task.
Linkable group/ring signature. Conceptually similar to the
linkability appeared in one-show credential [36], linkable
group/ring signatures [40, 41] were proposed to allow a
user to sign messages on behalf of his group unlinkably up
to twice.
In [42], a more general concept of event-oriented linkable
group signature was formulated to realize more fine-grained
trade-off between accountability and anonymity: a user can
sign on behalf of his group unlinkably up to k times per
event, where an event could be a common reference string
(e.g., the unique address to call a smart contract deployed in
the blockchain). But its main disadvantage is that the group
manager can reveal the actual identities of users. Similar
event-oriented linkability was discussed in the context of
ring signature [43] as well. Even though that construction
enjoys unbreakable anonymity, its main drawback becomes
the impracticability of “hiding” the real identity behind a
large group (mainly because the verification of signatures
might require the public keys of all group members).
6Our new primitive can be considered as a special
cryptographic notion to formalize the subtle balance be-
tween event-oriented linkability and irrevocable anonymity
(within a large and dynamic group). Specifically, our scheme
ensures that no one can link the actual identity to any
authenticated message (which is strictly stronger than [42]),
and also it enables a user to “hide” behind a large group of
users (i.e. all users registered at RA, which is impossible in
practice via [43]).
Privacy-preserving smart contracts. Privacy-preserving
smart contract is a recent hot topic in blockchain research.
Most of them are for general purpose consideration [44, 45],
and thus deploy heavy cryptographic tools including gen-
eral secure multi-party computation (MPC). Hawk [46] did
provide a general framework for privacy-preserving smart
contracts using light zk-SNARK, but mainly for reward re-
ceiver to prove to the contract. Our work can be considered
as a very specially designed MPC protocol, and a lot of ded-
icated optimizations of zk-SNARK exist which can directly
benefit our protocol. Last, cryptocurrencies like Zcash [47]
and Ethereum [48] also leverage zk-SNARK to build a public
ledger that supports anonymous transactions. We note that
they consider more basic blockchain infrastructures, on top
of which we may build our application for crowdsourcing.
4 PRELIMINARIES
Blockchain and smart contracts. A blockchain is a global
ledger maintained by a P2P network collectively following a
pre-defined consensus protocol. Each block in the chain will
aggregate some transactions containing use-case specific
data (e.g., monetary transfers, or program codes). In general,
we can view the blockchain as an ideal public ledger [49]
where one can write and read data in the clear. Moreover, it
will faithfully carry out certain pre-defined functionalities.
The last property captures the essence of smart contracts,
that every blockchain node will run them as programs
and update their local replicas according to the execution
results, collectively. More specifically, the properties of the
blockchain can be informally abstracted as the following
ideal public ledger model [46]:
1) Reliable delivery of messages. The blockchain can be mod-
eled as an ideal public ledger that ensures the liveness
and persistence of messages committed to it [49]. De-
tailedly, a message sent to the blockchain is in the form
of a validly signed transaction broadcasted to the whole
blockchain network, and then it will be solicited by a
block and written into the blockchain.
Remark that we assume the synchronous network
model [46, 50] of blockchain through the paper, that
means a transaction will appear in any honest node’s
replica within a certain time after it appears in the
blockchain network. Essentially, the blockchain delivers
any message in the form of valid transaction to any
blockchain node within a-priori delay.
Also we remark that a network adversary can reorder
transactions that are broadcasted to the network but not
yet written into a block.
2) Correct computation. The blockchain can be seen as a
state machine driven by messages included in each
block [51]. Specifically, miners and full nodes will per-
sistently receive newly proposed blocks, and faithfully
execute “programs” defined by current states with tak-
ing messages in new blocks as inputs. Moreover, the
computing results can be reliably delivered to the whole
network.
3) Transparency. All internal states of the blockchain will
be visible to the whole blockchain (intuitively, anyone).
Therefore, all message deliveries and computations via
the blockchain are in the clear.
4) Blockchain address (Pseudonym). By default, the sender of
a message in the blockchain is referred to a pseudonym,
a.k.a. blockchain address. In practice, a blockchain ad-
dress is usually bound to the hash of a public key;
more importantly, the security of digital signatures
can further ensure that one cannot send messages in
the name of a blockchain address, unless she has the
corresponding secret key.
Also, the program code of a smart contract deployed in
the blockchain can also be referred by a unique address,
such that one can call the contract to be executed, by
committing a message pointing to this unique address.
zk-SNARK. A zero-knowledge proof (zk-proof) allows a
party (i.e. prover) to generate a cryptographic proof con-
vincing another party (i.e. verifier) that some values are
obtained by faithfully executing a pre-defined computation
on some private inputs (i.e. witness) without revealing any
information about the private state. The security guarantees
are: (i) soundness, that no prover can convince a verifier if
she did not compute the results correctly; sometimes, we
require a stronger soundness that for any prover, there exists
an extractor algorithm which interacts with the prover and
can actually output the witness (a.k.a. proof-of-knowledge); (ii)
zero-knowledge, that the proof distribution can be simulated
without seeing any secret state, i.e., it leaks nothing about
the witness. Both above will hold with an overwhelming
probability.
The zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument
of knowledge (zk-SNARK) further allows such a proof
to be generated non-interactively. More importantly, the
proof is succinct, i.e., the proof size is independent on the
complexity of the statement to be proved, and is always
a small constant. More precisely, zk-SNARK is a tuple of
three algorithms. A setup algorithm can output the public
parameters to establish a SNARK for a NP-complete lan-
guageL = {~x | ∃~w, s.t., C(~x, ~w) = 1}. The Prover algorithm
can leverage the established SNARK to generate a constant-
size proof attesting the trueness of a statement ~x ∈ L with
witness ~w. The Verifier algorithm can efficiently check the
proof.
5 PROTOCOL: PRIVATE AND ANONYMOUS DE-
CENTRALIZED DATA CROWDSOURCING
In this section, we will construct a private and anonymous
protocol to address the critical challenges of decentralizing
crowdsourcing, without sacrificing security against “free-
riders” and “false-reporters”. The procedures of crowd-
sourcing will be decentralized atop an existing network of
7blockchain. More specifically, we will tackle the new privacy
and anonymity challenges brought by the blockchain.
As we briefly mentioned in previous sections, the sys-
tem will implicitly has a separate registration service that
validates each participant’s unique identity before issuing a
certificate. Such setup alleviates some basic problems that
every worker is allowed to submit no more than a fixed
number k of answers. For simplicity, we consider here k = 1.
Intuitions. Our basic strategy is to let the smart contract
(which is hosted by the blockchain network) to enforce
the fair exchange between the submitted answers and their
corresponding rewards, but without revealing any data or
any identity to the blockchain. Let us walk through the high
level ideas first.
The requester firstly codifies a reward policy parame-
terized by her budget (i.e. R(·; τ)) into a smart contract.
She broadcasts a transaction containing the contract code
and the budget. Once the smart contract is included in
the blockchain, it can be referred by a unique blockchain
address, and the budget should be deposited to this ad-
dress (otherwise, no one would participate). After that, any
worker who is interested in contributing could simply sub-
mit his answer to the blockchain, via a transaction pointing
to the contract’s address.
As pointed out before, we have to protect the confiden-
tiality of the answers, in order to ensure that answers from
different workers are independent. So the workers encrypt
the answers under the requester’s public key. Now the
contract cannot see the answers so it cannot calculate the
corresponding rewards. But the requester can retrieve all the
encrypted answers and decrypt them off-chain, and further
learn the rewards they deserve. It would be necessary that
the requester will correctly instruct the smart contract how to
proceed forward. Concretely, we will leverage the practical
cryptographic tool of zk-SNARK to enforce the requester
to prove: she indeed followed the pre-specified reward policy
calculating the rewards. Detailedly, the requester should
prove her instruction for rewarding is computed as follows:
(i) obtain all answers by decrypting all encrypted answers
using a secret key corresponding to the public key contained
in the smart contract; (ii) use all those answers and the
announced R(·; τ) to compute the quality of each answer.
A more challenging issue arises regarding anonymity-yet-
accountability. Also as briefly pointed before, we would like
to achieve a balance between anonymity and accountability.
Here we put forth a new cryptographic primitive to resolve
the natural tension. A user can anonymously authenticate
on messages (which are composed of a fixed length pre-
fix and the remaining part). But if the two authenticated
messages share a common prefix, anyone can tell whether
they are done by a same user or not. Moreover, no one
can link any two message-authentication pairs, as long as
these messages have different prefixes. Having this new
primitive in hand, a simple and intuitive solution to the
anonymous-yet-accountable protocol is to let each worker
anonymously authenticate on a message αC ||Ci, whenever
the encrypted answer Ci is submitted to a task contract C
that can be uniquely addressed by αC . This implies that
all submissions from the same worker to one task can be
linked and then counted, but any two submissions to two
different tasks will be provably unlinkable, even if they are
submitted by a same user. Also, the number of maximum
allowed submissions in each task can be easily tuned (by
counting linked submissions).
Last, we also need to augment the smart contract by
building the general algorithm of verifying zero-knowledge
proofs in it. In particular, when the smart contract re-
ceives an instruction regarding rewards and its proof, the
verification algorithm will be executed. All inputs of the
verification algorithm are common knowledge stored in the
open blockchain, e.g., the budget, the encrypted answers
and the public key of encryption. If a dishonest requester
reports a false instruction, her proof cannot be verified and
the contract will simply drop the instruction. What’s more,
if the smart contract does not receive a correct instruction
within a time limit, it can directly disseminate the budget to
all workers evenly as punishment (which can be considered
as part of the pre-specified incentive mechanism), since the
budget has been deposited. In this way, the requester cannot
gain any benefit by deviating from the protocol, and she will
be self-enforced to respond properly and timely, resulting
in that each worker will receive the expected reward. On
the other hand, a dishonest worker can never claim more
rewards than that he is supposed to get, as the reward is
calculated by the requester herself.
Fig. 2. Subtle linkability of the common-prefix-linkable anonymous au-
thentication scheme. All involved algorithms except Setup are shown in
bold.
5.1 Common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentica-
tion
Before the formal description of ZebraLancer’s protocol,
let us introduce the new primitive for achieving the
anonymous-yet-accountable authentication first. As briefly
shown in Fig.2, our new primitive can be built atop any
certification procedure, thus we include a certification gen-
eration procedure that can be inherited from any existing
one. Also, we insist on non-interactive authentication, thus all
the steps (including the authentication step) are described as
algorithms instead of protocols. Formally, a common-prefix-
linkable anonymous authentication scheme is composed of
the following algorithms:
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Notations related to common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication
Notation Represent for
(mpk,msk)
RA’s public-secret key pair, which is generated
by the algorithm of Setup
(pki, ski)
The public key certified by RA to bind the
unique ID i, and its corresponding secret key
CertGen
The algorithm executed by RA to issue a certifi-
cate associated to a registered public key
CertVrfy
The algorithm that can be run by anyone to
check the validity of a certificate
Auth
The algorithm to authenticate on a message with
using a certified public key
Verify
The algorithm to verify whether a message is
authenticated by a certified public key or not
Link
The algorithm to link two authenticated mes-
sages, if and only if they share a common-prefix
Prover
The zk-SNARK algorithm that generates zk-
proofs attesting the statements to be proven
Verifier
The zk-SNARK algorithm that checks whether
zk-proofs are generated faithfully or not
- Setup(1λ). This algorithm outputs the system’s master
public key mpk, and system’s master secret key msk,
where λ is the security parameter.
- CertGen(msk, pk). This algorithm outputs a certificate
cert to validate the public key.
- Auth(m, sk, pk, cert,mpk). This algorithm generates an
attestation π on a message m that: the sender of m
indeed owns a secret key corresponding to a valid
certificate.
- Verify(m,mpk, π). This algorithm outputs 0/1 to decide
whether the attestation is valid or not for the attested
message, with using system’s master public key.
- Link(mpk,m1, π1,m2, π2). This algorithm takes inputs
two valid message-attestation pairs. If m1,m2 have a
common-prefix with length λ, and π1, π2 are generated
from a same certificate, it outputs 1; otherwise outputs
0.
We also define the properties for a common-prefix-
linkable anonymous authentication. Correctness is straight-
forward that an honestly generated authentication can be
verified.Unforgeability also follows from the standard notion
of authentications, that if one does not own any valid
certificate, she cannot authenticate any message. We mainly
focus on the formalizing the security notions of common-
prefix-linkability and anonymity.
The first one characterizes a special accountability re-
quirement in anonymous authentication. It requires that
no efficient adversary can authenticate two messages with
a common-prefix without being linked, if using a same
certificate. More generally, if an attacker corrupts q users,
she cannot authenticate q + 1 messages sharing a common-
prefix, without being noticed. Formally, consider the fol-
lowing cryptographic game between a challenger C and an
attacker A:
1) Setup. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and
obtains the master keys.
2) CertGen queries. The adversary A submits q public
keys with different identities and obtains q different
certificates: cert1, . . . , certq.
3) Auth. The adversary A chooses q + 1 messages
p||m1, . . . , p||mq+1 sharing a common-prefix p (with
|p| = λ) and authenticates to the challenger C by
generating the corresponding attestations π1, . . . , πq+1.
Adversary A wins if all q + 1 authentications pass the veri-
fication, and no pair of those authentications were linked.
Definition 1 (Common-prefix-linkability). For all probabilis-
tic polynomial time algorithm A, Pr[A wins in the above game]
is negligible on the security parameter λ.
Next is the anonymity guarantee in normal cases. We
would like to ensure the anonymity against any party,
including the public, the registration authority, and the
verifier who can ask for multiple (and potentially correlated)
authentication queries. Also, our strong anonymity requires
that no one can even tell whether a user is authenticating for
different messages, if these messages have different prefixes.
The basic requirement for anonymity is that no one can
recognize the real identity from the authentication tran-
script. But our unlinkability requirement is strictly stronger,
as if one can recognize identity, obviously, she can link two
authentications by firstly recovering the actual identities.
To capture the unlinkability (among the authentications
of different-prefix messages), we can imagine the most
stringent setting, where there are only two honest users in
the system, the adversary still cannot properly link any of
them from a sequence of authentications. Formally, consider
the following game between the challenger C and adversary
A.
1) Setup. The adversary A generates the master key pair.
2) CertGen. The adversary A runs the certificate gener-
ation procedure as a registration authority with the
challenger. The challenger submits two public keys
pk0, pk1 and the adversary generates the corresponding
certificates for them cert0, cert1.A can always generate
certificates for public keys generated by herself.
3) Auth-queries. The adversary A asks the challenger to
serially use (sk0, pk0, cert0) and (sk1, pk1, cert1) to do
a sequence of authentications on messages chosen by
her. Also, the number q of authentication queries is cho-
sen by A. The adversary obtains 2q message-attestation
pairs.
4) Challenge. The adversary A chooses a new message
m∗ which does not have a common prefix with any
of the messages asked in the Auth-queries, and asks the
challenger to do one more authentication. C picks a ran-
dom bit b and authenticates onm∗ using skb, pkb, certb.
After receiving the attestation πb, A outputs her guess
b′.
The adversary wins if b′ = b.
Definition 2 (Anonymity). An authentication scheme is un-
linkable, if ∀ probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, |Pr[A
wins in the above game]− 1
2
| is negligible.4
4We remark that our definition of anonymity is strictly stronger
than that definition of the event-oriented linkable group signature [42],
in which the RA can revoke user anonymity under certain conditions.
9Construction. Now we proceed to construct such a prim-
itive. Same as many anonymous authentication construc-
tions, we will also use the zero-knowledge proof technique
towards anonymity. In particular, we will leverage zk-
SNARK to give an efficient construction. For the above
concept of common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentica-
tion, we need to further support the special accountability
requirement. The idea is as follows, since the condition
that “breaks” the linkability is common-prefix, thus the
authentication will do a special treatment on the prefix. In
particular, the authentication shows a tag committing to the
prefix together with the user’s secret key, and then presents
zero-knowledge proof that such a tag is properly formed,
i.e., computed by hashing the prefix and a secret key. To
ensure other basic security notions, we will also compute
the other tag that commits to the whole message. The user
will further prove in zero-knowledge that the secret key
corresponds to a certified public key.
Note that our main goal is to decentralize crowdsourc-
ing, such a new anonymous authentication primitive could
be further studied systematically in future works. Con-
cretely, we present the detailed construction as follows:
- Setup(λ). This algorithm establishes the public parame-
ters PP that will be needed for the zk-SNARK system.
Also, the algorithm generates a key pair (msk,mpk)
which is for a digital signature scheme.5
- CertGen(msk, pki): This algorithm runs a signing algo-
rithm on pki,
6 and obtains a signature σi. It outputs
certi := σi.
- Auth(p||m, ski, pki, certi, PP ): On inputing a message
p||m having a prefix p.
The algorithm first computes two tags (or interchange-
ably called headers later), t1 = H(p, ski) and t2 =
H(p||m, ski), where H is a secure hash function. Then,
let ~w = (ski, pki, certi) represent the private wit-
ness, and ~x = (p||m,mpk) be all common knowl-
edge, the algorithm runs zk-SNARK proving algorithm
Prover(~x, ~w, PP ) for the following language LT :=
{t1, t2, ~x = (p||m,mpk) | ∃~w = (ski, pki, certi) s.t.
CertVrfy(certi, pki,mpk) = 1∧pair(pki, ski) = 1∧t1 =
H(p, ski) ∧ t2 = H(p||m, ski)}, where the CertVrfy
algorithm checks the validity of the certificate using
a signature verification, and pair algorithm verifies
whether two keys are a consistent public-secret key
pair. This prove algorithm yields a proof η for the
statement ~x ∈ L (also for the proof-of-knowledge of
~w).
Finally, the algorithm outputs π := (t1, t2, η).
- Verify(p||m,π,mpk, PP ): this algorithm runs the veri-
fying algorithm of zk-SNARK Verifier on ~x, π and PP ,
and outputs the decision bit d ∈ {0, 1}.
5To be more precise, the public parameter generation could be from
another algorithm. For simplicity, we put it here. In the security game
for anonymity, the adversary only generates msk,mpk, not the public
parameter.
6We assume an external identification procedure that can check the
actual identity bound to each public key, and the user key pairs are
generated using common algorithms, e.g., for a digital signature. We
ignore the details here.
- Link(m1, π1,m2, π2): On inputting two attestations
π1 := (t
1
1, t
1
2, η1) and π2 := (t
2
1, t
2
2, η2), the algorithm
simply checks t11
?
= t21. If yes, output 1; otherwise,
output 0. We also use Link(π1, π2) for short.
Security analysis (sketch). Here we briefly sketch the se-
curity analysis for the construction. As the scheme is of in-
dependent interests, we defer detailed analyses/reductions
to an extended paper where the scientific behind will be
formally studied.
Regarding correctness, it is trivial, because of the com-
pleteness of underlying SNARK.
Regarding unforgeability, we require an uncertified at-
tacker cannot authenticate. The only transcripts can be seen
by the adversary are headers and the zero-knowledge at-
testation. Headers include one generated by hashing the
concatenation of p||m, sk. In order to provide a header,
the attacker has to know the corresponding sk, as it can
be extracted in the random oracle queries. Thus there are
only two different ways for the attacker: (i) the attacker
generates forges the certificate, which clearly violates the
signature security; (ii) the attacker forges the attestation
using an invalid certificate, which clearly violates the proof-
of-knowledge of the zk-SNARK.
Regarding the common-prefix-linkability, it is also fairly
straightforward, as the final authentication transcript con-
tains a header computed by H(p, sk) which is an invariable
for a common prefix p using the same secret key sk.
Regarding the anonymity/unlinkability, we require that
after seeing a bunch of authentication transcripts from
one user, the attacker cannot figure out whether a new
authentication comes from the same user. This holds even
if the attacker can be the registration authority that issues
all the certificates. To see this, as the attacker will not be
able to figure the value of the sk from all public value,
thus the headers/tags can be considered as random values.
It follows that H(p, sk) and a random value r cannot be
distinguished (similarly forH(p||m, sk)). More importantly,
due to the zero-knowledge property of zk-SNARK, given
r, a simulator can simulate a valid proof η∗ by controlling
the common reference string of the zk-SNARK. That said,
the public transcript t1, t2, η can be simulated by r1, r2, η
∗
where r1, r2 are uniform values, and η
∗ is a simulated proof,
all of which has nothing to do with the actual witness sk.
Summarizing the above intuitive analyses, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. Conditioned on that the hash function to be mod-
eled as a random oracle and the zk-SNARK is zero-knowledge,
the construction of the common-prefix-linkable anonymous au-
thentication satisfies anonymity. Conditioned on the underlying
digital signature scheme used is secure, and the zk-SNARK sat-
isfies proof-of-knowledge, our construction of the common-prefix-
linkable anonymous authentication will be unforgeable. It is also
correct and common-prefix linkable.
5.2 The protocol of ZebraLancer
Now we are ready to present a general protocol for a class
of crowdsourcing tasks having proper quality-aware incen-
tives mechanisms defined as in Section 2. As zk-SNARK
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requires a setup phase, we consider that a setup algorithm
generated the public parameters PP for this purpose, and
published it as common knowledge.7 Our descriptions fo-
cuses on the application atop the open blockchain, and
therefore omits details of sending messages through the
underlying blockchain infrastructure. For example, “one
uses blockchain address α to send a message m to the
blockchain” will represent that he broadcasts a blockchain
transaction containing the message m, the public key asso-
ciated to α, and the signature properly generated under the
corresponding secret key.
Fig. 3. The schematic diagram of the protocol of ZebraLancer for the
quality-aware incentive mechanisms as proof-of-concept. Encrypted an-
swers and the instruction of rewarding are pointing to the task published
as a smart contract.
Remark that here we let each worker/requester to gen-
erate a different blockchain address for each task (i.e. a
one-task-only address) as a simple solution to avoid de-
anonymization in the underlying blockchain.8 For concrete
instantiations of the underlying infrastructures, see the im-
plementations in Section 6. We further remark that the pro-
tocol can be extended to private and anonymous auction-
based incentives trivially (see Appendix B for a concrete
example), although it mainly focuses on quality-aware ones.
Protocol details. As shown in Fig.3, the details of Ze-
braLancer protocol can be described as follows:
7This in practice can be done via a secure multiparty computation
protocol [52] to eliminate potential backdoors.
8Our anonymous protocol mainly focuses on the application layer
such as the crowdsourcing functionality that is built on top of the
blockchain infrastructure. If the underlying blockchain layer supports
anonymous transaction, such as Zcash [47], the worker and the re-
quester can re-use account addresses. We further remark that the
anonymity in network layer are out the scope of this paper, we may
deploy our protocol on existing infrastructure such as Tor.
TABLE 3
Key notations related to the protocol of ZebraLancer
Notation Represent for
C
The smart contract programmed for the crowd-
sourcing task to be published
αC
The blockchain address of C , which is also used
as the prefix for authentication
αR
The one-time blockchain address used by the
requester R to anonymously interact with C
αi
The one-time blockchain address used by the
workerWi to anonymously interact with C
(esk, epk)
The one-time public-secret key pair used in C for
encrypting/decrypting crowd-shared answers
Ci
The encrypted answer submitted to C by the
workerWi, i.e. the ciphertext of answer Ai
R
The instruction sent from the requester to instruct
the smart contract to reward each crowd-shared
answer
pireward
The zk-SNARK proof generated to attest the cor-
rectness of the instruction of paying rewards
pii
The attestation sent from a user i to anonymously
authenticate a message having a prefix αC
PP
Public parameters for zero-knowledge proof,
including the one for common-prefix-linkable
anonymous authentication and the one for incen-
tive mechanism
• Register. Everyone registers at RA to get a certificate bound
to his/her unique ID, which is done off-line only once for per
each participant.
A requester, having a unique ID denoted by R, creates
a public-secret key pair (pkR, skR), and registers at the
registration authority (RA) to obtain a certificate certR
binding pkR to R. Each worker, having a unique ID
denoted byWi, also generates his public and secret key
pair (pki, ski), and registers his public key at RA to
obtain a certificate certi binding pki andWi.
• TaskPublish. A requester anonymously authenticates and
publishes a task contract with a promised reward policy.
When the requester R has a crowdsourcing task, she
generates a fresh blockchain account address αR, and a
key pair (epk, esk) (which will be used for workers to
encrypt submissions) for this task only.
R then prepares parameters Param, including the
encryption key epk, the number of answers to
collect (denoted by n), the deadline, the budget
τ , the reward policy R, SNARK’s public parame-
ters PP , RA’s public key mpk, and also πR =
Auth(αC ||αR, skR, pkR, certR, PP ).9
9We remark that the requester should authenticate on her
blockchain address αR along with the task contract, and workers will
join the task only if the task contract is indeed sent from a blockchain
address as same as the authenticated αR. So a malicious requester
cannot “authenticate” a task by copying other valid authentications.
In addition, each worker has to authenticate on his blockchain address
αi along with his answer submission as well. The task contract will
check the submission is indeed sent from a blockchain address same to
the authenticated αi. Otherwise, a malicious worker can launch free-
riding through copying and re-sending authenticated submissions that
have been broadcasted but not yet confirmed by a block.
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The requester then codes a smart contract C that con-
tains all above information for her task. After compiling
C , she puts C ’s code and a transfer of the budget into
a blockchain transaction, and uses the one-task-only
address αR to send the transaction into the blockchain
network. When a block containing C is appended to the
blockchain, C gets an immutable blockchain address
αC to hold the budget and interact with anyone.
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See Algorithm 1 below for a concrete example of task
contract. (The important component of verifying zk-
proofs is done by calling a library libsnark.Verifier in-
tegrated into the blockchain infrastructure, and imple-
mentation details will be explained in Section 6).
• AnswerCollection. The contract collects anonymously au-
thenticated encrypted answers from workers who didn’t sub-
mit before.
If a registered worker Wi is interested in contributing,
he first validates the contract content (e.g., checking the
parameters), then generates a one-time blockchain ad-
dress αi. He signs his answer Ai with using the private
key associated with the blockchain address αi to obtain
a signature σi, then encrypts the signed answer Ai||σi
under the task’s public key epk to obtain ciphertext Ci.
Note that σi can be verified by the chain address αi,
e.g., it is generated by the same signing algorithm to
sign transactions.
He then uses common-prefix-linkable anonymous au-
thentication scheme to generate an attestation πi =
Auth(αC ||αi||Ci, ski, pki, certi, PP ).9 Then he uses his
one-time address αi to send Ci, πi to the blockchain
network (with a pointer to αC , i.e. the unique address
of the contract C ).
Then, C runs Verify(αC ||αi||Ci, πi,mpk, PP ), and also
executes Link(πi, π∗) for each valid authentication at-
testation π∗ that was received before (including re-
quester’s, namely πR). Such that, C can ensure Ci is
the first submission of a registered worker. For unau-
thenticated or double submissions, C simply drops it.11
The contract C will keep on collecting answers, until
it receives n answers or the deadline (in unit of block)
passes. It also records each address αi that sends Ci.
Remark that Link algorithm will be executed O(n2)
times, but it is a simple equality check over a pair of
hashes, such that the cost of running it for several times
will be nearly nothing in practice.
Along the way, the requester can keep on listening the
blockchain, and decrypts each submission Ci that is
sent by αi and accepted by the contract. Such that,
the requester can obtain the signed answer Ai||σi
bound to Ci, and verifies the signature σi using the
blockchain address αi. If Ai is not properly signed,
10We emphasize that αC will be unique per each contract. In
practice, αC can be computed via H(αR||counter), where H is a
secure hash function, and counter is governed by the blockchain to
be increased by exact one for each contract created by the blockchain
address αR. It’s also clear that the requester R can predicate αC before
C is on-chain, such that she can compute piR off-line and let it be a
parameter of contract C .
11We remark that our protocol can be extended trivially to allow
each worker to submit some k answers in one task by modifying the
checking condition programmed in the smart contract of crowdsourc-
ing task.
Algorithm 1: Example using quality-aware incentive
Require : This contract’s address αC ; requester’s
one-time blockchain address αR; requester’s
authenticating attestation πR; RA’s public key
mpk; budget τ ; public key epk for encrypting
answers; SNARK’s public parameters PP ;
number of requested answers n; deadline of
answering in unit of block TA; deadline of
instructing reward in unit of block TI .
1 List keeping answers’ ciphertexts, C ← ∅;
2 Map of anonymous attestations and authenticated
one-time blockchain addresses of workers,W ← ∅;
3 if getBalance(αC ) < τ ∨ ¬Verify(αC ||αR, πR,mpk,PP )
then
4 goto 24 ; ⊲ Unidentified requester or no deposit.
5 timerA ← a timer expires after TA; ⊲ Collect answers
6 while ||C|| < n ∧ timerA NOT expired do
7 if αi sends πi, Ci then
8 if ¬Link(πi, πR)∧ ∀π∗ ∈ W .keys() ¬Link(πi, π∗)∧
Verify(αC ||αi||Ci, πi,mpk, PP ) then
9 W .add(πi → αi); C.add(Ci);
10 if αR sends i, πfake then
11 if libsnark.Verifier((Ci, σi), πfake, PP ) then
12 W .remove(πi → αi); C.remove(Ci);
13 timerI ← a timer expires after TI ; ⊲ Wait instruction
14 while timerR NOT expired do
15 if αR sends R := (R1, . . . , Rn) and πreward then
16 P ← (epk, τ, C1, . . . , Cn);
17 if libsnark.Verifier((P,R), πreward, PP ) then
18 for each (πi → αi) ∈W do
19 transfer(αC, αi, Ri);
20 goto 24;
21 R← τ/||W ||; ⊲ Reward all if no correct instruction
22 for each (πi → αi) ∈W do
23 transfer(αC, αi, R);
24 transfer(αC, αR, getBalance(αC)); ⊲ Refund the else
25 function getBalance(addr)
26 return the balance of addr in the ledger;
27 function transfer(src, dst, v)
28 if getBalance(src) < v then
29 return false;
30 src’s balance - v; dst’s balance + v; return true;
31 ⊲ The correctness and availability of this task contract is
governed by the blockchain network; the contract
program is driven by a “discrete” clock that increments
with validating each newly proposed block
32 ⊲ libsnark.Verifier is a library embedded in the runtime
environment of smart contract such as EVM
the requester will generate a zero-knowledge proof
πfake to convince the contract that the plaintext bound
to Ci is not correctly signed message. Particularly,
the proof is generated by zk-SNARK’s Prover al-
gorithm to attest the statement that (Ci, epk, αi) ∈
{Ci, epk, αi | ∃esk, s.t., verifying(αi, Ai, σi) 6= 1 ∧
Ai||σi = Dec(esk, Ci) ∧ pair(esk, epk) = 1}, where
verifying is a function that outputs 1 iff the inputs
correspond properly signed message. Once the contract
receives and validates such a proof πfake for a given
submission from αi, it will remove Ci and αi. Note
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that the above proof and verification are necessary to
prevent the network adversaries who can delay others’
submissions, and then copy and paste others’ cipher-
texts to reap rewards.
• Reward. The requester computes and prove how to reward
properly authenticated anonymous answers.
The requester R keeps listening to the blockchain, and
once C collects n submissions, she retrieves and de-
crypts all of them to obtain the corresponding answers
A1, . . . , An (if there are not enough submissions when
the deadline passes, the requester simply sets the re-
maining answers to be ⊥ which has been considered
by the incentive mechanism R).
Next, the requester computes the reward for each an-
swer Ri = R(Ai;A1, . . . , An, τ) as specified by the
policy codified in C . More importantly, she generates a
zero knowledge proof πreward, with the secret key esk
as witness to attest the validity of the instruction. In par-
ticular, the proof is for the following NP-language L =
{R,P | ∃esk s.t. ∧nj=1Aj ||σi = Dec(esk, Cj) ∧
n
j=1 Rj =
R(Aj ;A1, . . . , An, τ) ∧ pair(esk, epk) = 1}, where P
denotes Param together with ciphertexts C1, . . . , Cn;
while R := (R1, . . . , Rn) is the instruction about how
to reward each answer. After computingR and πreward,
R puts them into a blockchain transaction, and still
use her one-task-only blockchain address αR to send
the transaction to C (by using a pointer to αC ). This
finishes the outsource-then-prove methodology.
Once a newly proposed block contains the reward
instruction R and its attestation πreward, the contract
C first checks that they are indeed sent from αR
(by verifying the digital signature of the underlying
blockchain transaction). Then it leverages SNARK’s
Verifier algorithm to verify the proof πreward regarding
the correctness of R. If the verification passes, it trans-
fers each amountRi to each account αi, and refunds the
remaining balance to αR. Otherwise, pause. If receiving
no valid instruction after a predefined time (in unit of
block), the contract simply transfers τ/n to each αi as
part of the policy R.
5.3 Analysis of the protocol
Correctness and efficiency. It is clear to see that the re-
quester will obtain data and the workers would receive the
right amount of payments. If they all follow the protocol,
under the conditions that (i) the blockchain can be modeled
as an ideal public ledger, (ii) the underlying zk-SNARK is
of completeness, (iii) the public key encryption is correct,
and (iv) common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication
satisfies correctness. Regarding efficiency, we note the on-
chain computation (and storage which are two of the major
obstacles for applying blockchain in general) is actually very
light, as the contract essentially only carries a verification
step. Thanks to zk-SNARK, the verification can be efficiently
executed by checking only a few pairing equalities; more-
over, the special library can be dedicatedly optimized in
various ways [53].
Security analysis (sketch). We briefly discuss security here
and defer the details to an extended version. The underlying
primitives, including our common-prefix-linkable anony-
mous authentication scheme, are well abstracted, which
enable us to argue security in a modular way.
Regarding the data confidentiality of answers, all related
public transcripts are simply the ciphertextsC1, . . . , Cn, and
the zk-SNARK proof π. The ciphertexts are easily simulat-
able according to the semantic security of the public key
encryption, and the proof π can also be simulated without
seeing the secret witness because of the zero-knowledge prop-
erty.
Regarding the anonymity, an adversary has two ways to
break it: (i) link a worker/requester through his blockchain
addresses; (ii) link answers/tasks of a worker/requester
through his authenticating attestations. The first case is
trivial, simply because every worker/requester will inter-
act with each task by a randomly generated one-task-only
blockchain address (and the corresponding public key). The
second case is more involved, but the anonymity of workers
and requesters can be derived through the anonymity of the
common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication scheme.
Regarding the security against a malicious requester, a
malicious requester has three chances to gain advantage:
(i) deny the policy announced in TaskPublish phase; (ii)
cheat in Reward phase; (iii) submit answers to intention-
ally downgrade others in AnswerCollection phase. The first
threat is prevented because the smart contract is public,
and the requester cannot deny it once it is posted in the
immutable blockchain. The second threat is prohibited by
the soundness of the underlying zk-SNARK, since any
incorrect instruction passing the verification in the smart
contract, directly violates the proof-of-knowledge (i.e. the
strong soundness). The last threat is simply handled the un-
forgeability and common-prefix-linkability of our common-
prefix-linkable anonymous authentication scheme.
Security against malicious workers is straightforward, the
only ways that malicious workers can cheat are: (i) sub-
mitting more than one answers in AnswerCollection phase;
(ii) copying and pasting others’ answers to earn reward;
(iii) sending the contract a fake instruction in the name
of requester in Reward phase; (iv) altering the policy
specified in the contract. The first threat is simply han-
dled by the common-prefix-linkability and unforgeability
of common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication. The
second threat can be approached by predicating the plain-
texts of answers or copying the ciphertexts, but both are
prevented: predicating plaintext is prevented due to the
semantical security of public key encryption; copying the
ciphertexts are prevented because the securities of digital
signature and zk-SNARK. The third threat is simply han-
dled by the security of digital signatures. The last issue
is trivial, because the blockchain security ensures the an-
nounced policy is immutable.
Theorem 2. The data confidentiality of our protocol holds, if the
underlying public key encryption is semantically secure and the
used zk-SNARK is of zero-knowledge.
The anonymity of our protocol for both workers and requesters
will be satisfied, if the underlying common-prefix-linkable anony-
mous authentication satisfies the anonymity defined in Definition
2, and the zk-SNARK is zero-knowledge.
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Conditioned on that the blockchain infrastructure we rely on
can be modeled as an ideal public ledger, the underlying common-
prefix-linkable anonymous authentication satisfies the unforge-
ability and the common-prefix-linkability, the zk-SNARK satisfies
proof-of-knowledge and the digital signature in use is secure,
our protocol satisfies: security against a malicious requester and
security against malicious workers.
6 ZEBRALANCER: IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPER-
IMENTAL EVALUATION
We implement the protocol of ZebraLancer atop Ethereum,
and instantiate a series of typical image annotation tasks [11]
with using it. Furthermore, we conduct experiments of these
tasks in an Ethereum test net to evaluate the applicability.
Fig. 4. The system-level view of ZebraLancer. Our Dapp layer can be
built on top of an existing blockchain, e.g. the Ethereum Byzantium
release [48].
System in a nutshell. As shown in Fig.4, the decentralized
application (DApp) of our system is composed of an on-
chain part and an off-chain part. The on-chain part consists
of crowdsourcing task contracts and an interface contract
of the registration authority (RA). The RA’s contract simply
posits the system’s master public key as a common knowl-
edge stored in the blockchain. The off-chain part consists
of requester clients and worker clients. These clients can
be blockchain clients wrapped with functionalities required
by our system. Specifically, a client of requester should
codify a specific task with a given incentive mechanism
and announces it as a smart contract. Note that we, as
the designers of the DApp, can provide contract templates
to requesters for easier instantiation of incentive mecha-
nisms, c.f. [54]. The clients further need an integrated zk-
SNARK prover to produce the anonymous authenticating
attestations; moreover, a requester client should also lever-
age SNARK prover to generate proofs attesting the correct
execution of incentive policies.
We also compare ZebraLancer to some existing crowd-
sourcing systems in Table.4. The security performance of
our system overwhelms others, as it considers themost strict
fairness of exchange, user anonymity and data confidential-
ity, under that condition of minimum trust. For example,
our design realizes the fair exchange without leaking data
to a third-party information arbiter. And ZebraLancer also
guarantees the strongest user anonymity that cannot be
broken by any third-party (even the registration authority),
while the anonymity of other systems can be broken by
a third-party authority (or few colluded third-parties). Re-
mark that the identities established via a registration service
are required by all systems in Table.4.
TABLE 4
Comparison between our system ZebraLancer and some other
crowdsourcing platforms
Ours MTurk Dynamo SPPEAR CrowdBC
[2] [27] [28] [23]
Preventing
false-reporting
√ × × © √
Preventing
free-riding
√ © © © √
Data confiden-
tiality
√ × × × ×
User
anonymity
√ × © © ×
Note:
√
denotes a functionality realized without relying on any
central trust except the established identities;© denotes a (partially)
realized function by relying on a central trust (other than the
registration authority); × denotes an unrealized feature. Note that the
data confidentiality is marked as ×, if any third-party other than the
requesters can access the submitted data.
Implementation challenges. The main challenge of de-
ploying smart contracts in general is that they can only
support very light on-chain operations for both computing
and storing.12 Our protocol actually has taken this into
consideration. In particular, our on-chain computation only
consists SNARK verifications, while the heavy computation
of SNARK proofs are all done off the blockchain. Even still,
building an efficient privacy-preserving DApp compatible
with existing blockchain platform such as Ethereum is not
straightforward. For instance, in order to allow smart con-
tracts to call a zk-SNARK verification library, a contract of
this library should be thrown into a block, but this library
is a general purpose tool that can be too complex to be
executed in the smart contract runtime environment, e.g.
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Alternatively, we modify
the the runtime environment of smart contracts, so that an
optimized zk-SNARK verification library [53] is embedded
in it as a primitive operation. Our modified Ethereum client
is written in Java 1.8 with Spring framework, and is avail-
able at github.com/maxilbert/ethereumj.
We remark that Ethereum project recently integrated
some new cryptographic primitives into EVM to enable
SNARK verification as well [48], which ensures our DApp
can essentially inherit all Ethereum users to maintain the
blockchain infrastructure to govern the faithful execution of
the smart contracts in our DApp.
Establishments of zk-SNARKs (off-line). As the feasibility
of ZebraLancer highly depends on the tininess of SNARK
12We remark the communication overhead is not a serious worry,
because: (i) a blockchain network such as Ethereum does not require
fully meshed connections, i.e. requesters and workers can only connect
a constant number of Ethereum peers; (ii) if necessary, requesters and
workers can even run on top of so-called light-weight nodes, which
eventually allows them receive and send messages only related to
crowdsourcing tasks; (iii) even if there is a trusted arbiter facilitating
incentive mechanisms, the only saving in communication is just an
instruction about how to reward answers (and its attestation).
14
proofs and the efficiency of SNARK verifications, it be-
comes critical to establish necessary zk-SNARKs off-line.
As formally discussed before, the authentication scheme
and nearly all incentive mechanisms can be stated as some
well-defined deterministic constraint relationships. We first
translate these mathematical statements into their corre-
sponding boolean circuit satisfiability representations. Fur-
thermore, we establish zk-SNARK for each boolean circuit,
such that all required public parameters are generated. All
the above steps are done off-line, as they are executed
for only once when the system is launched. Note that the
potential backdoors in these zk-SNARK public parameters
could be further eliminated via an off-line protocol based
on secure multi-party computation [52]. However, such an
off-line setup is beyond the scope of showing our system
feasibility.
An image annotation crowdsourcing task. To showcase the
usability of our system, we implement a concrete crowd-
sourcing task of image annotation similar to the ones in
[11]. The task is to solicit labels for an image which can
later be used to train a learning machine. The task requests
n answers from n workers, and can be considered as a
multi-choice problem. Majority voting is used to estimate
the “truth”. An answer is seen as “correct”, if it equals to the
“truth”. The reward amount of a worker is τ/n if he answers
correctly, otherwise, he receives nothing. In our terminol-
ogy, the reward Ri := R(Ai;A1, . . . , An, τ) = τ/n, if Ai
equals the majority; otherwise, Ri = 0. Following [11], we
implement and deploy 5 contracts in the test net to collect
3 answers, 5 answers, 7 answers, 9 answers and 11 answers
from anonymous-yet-accountable workers, respectively.
The smart contracts are written in Solidity, a high-
level scripting language translatable to smart contracts of
Ethereum. We also modify Solidity compiler, such that a
programmer can write a contract involving zk-SNARK ver-
ifications at high-level. We instantiate the encryption to be
RSA-OAEP-2048, the DApp-layer hash function to be SHA-
256, and the DApp-layer digital signature to be RSA signa-
ture. Moreover, for zk-SNARK, we choose the construction
of libsnark from [53]. We deploy a test network consisting of
four PCs: three PCs are equipped with Intel Xeon E3-1220V2
CPU (PC-As), and the other one is equipped with Intel i7-
4790 CPU (PC-B); all PCs have 16 GB main memory and
have Ubuntu 14.04 LTS installed. In the test net, a PC-A and
a PC-B play the role of miners, and the other two PC-As only
validate blocks (i.e. full nodes that do not mine). One full
node plays the role of the requester, and anonymously pub-
lishes crowdsourcing tasks to the blockchain; and the other
full node mimics workers, and sends each anonymously
authenticated answer from a different blockchain address.
Miners are only responsible to maintain the test net and do
not involve in tasks.
Performance evaluation. As the main bottleneck is the on-
chain computation of the smart contract, we first measure
the time cost and the spatial cost of miners, regarding the ex-
ecutions of zk-SNARK verifications used in the above anno-
tation tasks. These zk-SNARKs are established for common-
prefix-linkable anonymous authentications and incentive
mechanisms, respectively. The results of time cost are listed
in Table 5. It is clear that zk-SNARK verifications in our
TABLE 5
Execution time of in-contract zk-SNARK verifications.
Verification for
Operands Length Time@
PC-A
Time@
PC-BProof Key Inputs
Our authentication 729B 1.2KB 1.5KB 10.9ms 6.2ms
Majority (3-Worker) 729B 16.0KB 3.4KB 15.5ms 9.1ms
Majority (5-Worker) 730B 21.6KB 4.7KB 16.3ms 9.8ms
Majority (7-Worker) 731B 27.3KB 6.0KB 17.0ms 10.3ms
Majority (9-Worker) 729B 32.9KB 7.3KB 17.5ms 12.1ms
Majority (11-Worker) 730B 38.6KB 8.6KB 17.9ms 13.1ms
Note: the sizes of proofs, keys and inputs are their bytes after being
serialized in unicode.
system can be efficiently executed in respect of verification
time. Moreover, our experiment results also reveal that the
spatial cost of zk-SNARK verifications is constant and tiny
at both types of PCs (exactly 17MB main memory). Also,
the required on-chain storage for the task contracts is at
the acceptable magnitude of kilobyte. Therefore, the on-
chain performance of the system can be clearly practical,
considering both time and space.
At the off-chain side of requester, we consider refor-
mation of the statements of attesting correct payments
to enhance the off-chain efficiency, as the inherent heavy
NP-reductions of generating zk-SNARK proofs could be
prohibitively expensive for the requester without care-
ful optimizations. Briefly speaking, we reform L =
{R,P | ∃esk s.t. ∧nj=1Aj ||σi = Dec(esk, Cj) ∧
n
j=1 Rj =
R(Aj ;A1, . . . , An, τ) ∧ pair(esk, epk) = 1}, and translate it
into L′ = {R,P | ∃esk s.t. ∧nj=1Cj = Enc(epk,Aj ||σi) ∧
n
j=1
Rj = R(Aj ;A1, . . . , An, τ) ∧ pair(esk, epk) = 1}, because
epk, as the exponent of modular exponentiation operations,
is significantly smaller than esk in RSA, and therefore the
latter language corresponds a more compact arithmetic cir-
cuit and essentially brings more efficient proving. The prov-
ing cost at the requester end therefore becomes acceptable;
for example, to prove the majority of 11 workers’ binary
voting, the requester spends 56 GB memory+swap and less
than 2 hours, which was hundreds of gigabytes and about
one day without such the optimization [55].
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Fig. 5. The time of generating common-prefix-linkable anonymous au-
thentications in two PCs. The box plot is derived from 12 different
experiments.
We also measure the off-chain cost of anonymity, if
one uses the common-prefix-linkable anonymous authen-
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tication. We measure the running time of generating the
authenticating attestations at PCs. As shown in Fig.5, our
experiment results clarify that about 78 seconds are spent
on generating an anonymous attestation with using PC-
A (3.1 GHz CPU). In PC-B (3.6GHz CPU), the running
time can be shortened to about 62 seconds. Those are not
ideal, but acceptable by the anonymity-sensitive workers.
We remark that our protocol can be trivially extended to
support non-anonymous mode, in case that one gives up
the anonymity privilege: s/he can generate a public-private
key pair (for digital signatures), and then registers the public
key at RA to receive a certificate bound to the public key; to
authenticate, s/he can simply show the certified public key,
the certificate, along with a message properly signed under
the corresponding secret key, which essentially costs nearly
nothing regarding the computational efficiency.
7 EXTENSION FOR AUCTION-BASED INCENTIVES
The pseudocode in Algorithm 2 showcases how to extend
the ZebraLancer protocol to instantiate a private and anony-
mous crowdsourcing task using an auction-based incentive
mechanism to pre-select workers. The main difference is
using auction to pre-select workers before they submit data
(line 6-12). As shown in the algorithm, the workers can
signed their bids (with using their private keys associated
with the blockchain addresses), and then encrypt these
signed bids under requester’s public key. The ciphertexts
can be sent to the task contract (line 7-9). Then, the requester
is allowed to convince the contract that the plaintext bound
to a submission is not properly signed by the corresponding
worker (line 10-12). Moreover, the requester is then incen-
tivized to leverage the outsource-then-prove method to prove
the result of auction (i.e. the selected workers) to the task
contract (line 13-18). After the workers are selected, they
can submit answers to the contract (line 20-25).
The main motivation of the above “private” bidding
process is to prevent a malicious worker from learning
the bidding strategies of honest workers through exploring
all historic bids stored in the open blockchain, which is
an implicit requirement of most auction-based incentive
mechanisms (mainly for truthfulness). For example, when
the requester is using an incentive mechanism (e.g. a variant
of reverse Vickrey auction [8]) to make workers give their
truthful bids, if a malicious worker can well estimate the
distribution of all other bids, then an optimized bid, which
is usually untruthful, can be explored by him to break
the requester’s auction mechanism. Note that the public
parameter of the zk-SNARK for verifying the result of the
auction (i.e. pre-selected workers) is established off-line
and published as common knowledge, such that it can be
referred in the contract by PP .
Remark that the private auction atop blockchain is an
interesting orthogonal problem [56] per se. Nevertheless,
ZebraLancer is really general, and can be adapted for a very
broad variety of incentive mechanisms including auctions,
although we didn’t intentionally focus on private auctions.
It is also clear that our common-prefix-linkable anony-
mous authentication scheme can be straightforwardly used
Algorithm 2: Example of auction-based incentive
Require : This contract’s address αC ; requester’s
one-time blockchain address αR; requester’s
authenticating attestation πR; RA’s public key
mpk; budget τ ; public key epk for encrypting
bids and answers; SNARK’s public parameters
PP ; deadline of bidding in unit of block TB ;
deadline of instructing auction result in unit of
block TI ; deadline of answering in unit of block
TA; deadline of instructing auction result in
unit of block TI .
1 List keeping the ciphertexts of bids, B ← ∅;
2 Map of anonymous attestations and authenticated
one-time blockchain addresses of workers,W ← ∅;
3 if getBalance(αC ) < τ ∨ ¬Verify(αC ||αR, πR,mpk,PP )
then
4 goto 26 ; ⊲ Unidentified requester or no deposit.
5 timerB ← a timer expires in TB; ⊲ Collect secret bids.
6 while timerB NOT expired do
7 if αi sends πi, and his encrypted bid Bi then
8 if ¬Link(πi, πR)∧ ∀π∗ ∈ W .keys() ¬Link(πi, π∗)∧
Verify(αC ||αi, πi, mpk,PP ) then
9 W .add(Wi := (πi → αi)); B.add(Bi);
10 if αR sends i, πfake then
11 if libsnark.Verifier((Bi, σi), πfake, PP ) then
12 W .remove(πi → αi); B.remove(Bi);
13 timerI ← a timer expires after TI ; ⊲ Wait instruction
14 while timerI NOT expired do
15 if αR sends selected workers S := (W1′ , . . . ,Wn′) and
πauction then
16 P ← (epk, τ, B1, . . . , B||B||,W1, . . . ,W||W ||);
17 if libsnark.Verifier((P, S), πauction, PP ) then
18 goto 20;
19 S = W ; ⊲ All workers are “selected” if no instruction.
20 timerA ← a timer expires after TA; ⊲ Collect answers
21 while ||S|| 6= 0 ∧ timerA NOT expired do
22 if αi sends encrypted answer Ci then
23 if (∗ → αi) ∈ S then
24 transfer(αC, αi, Bi);
25 S.remove((∗ → αi));
26 transfer(αC, αR, getBalance(αC)); ⊲ Refund the else
to make the auction-based extension to be anonymous-
yet-accountable, as the multiple bidding of each worker
is prevented by its subtle common-prefix linkability. To
further allow a worker submit k bids in a single task, we
can instantiate a counter in the smart contract to track the
number of bids from each worker, because of the common-
prefix-linkability property.
8 CONCLUSION & OPEN PROBLEMS
ZebraLancer can facilitate a large variety of incentive mech-
anisms to realize the fair exchange between the crowd-
shared data and their corresponding rewards, without the
involvement of any third-party arbiter. Moreover, it shows
the practicability to resolve two natural tensions in the
use-case of the decentralized crowdsourcing atop open
blockchain: one between the data confidentiality and the
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blockchain transparency, and the other one between the
participants’ anonymity and the their accountability.
Along the way, we put forth a new anonymous authen-
tication scheme. Besides the strong anonymity that cannot
be revoked by any authority, it also supports a delicate link-
ability only for messages that share the common prefix and
are authenticated by the same user. A concrete construction
of the scheme is proposed, and it shows the compatibility to
real-world blockchain infrastructure. The delicate linkability
of the scheme is subtly different from the state-of-the-art
of anonymous-yet-accountable authentication schemes [34–
39, 42], and we envision the scheme might be of indepen-
dent interests. We also develop a general outsource-then-prove
technique to use smart contracts in a privacy-preserving
way. This technique can further extend the scope of ap-
plications atop some existing privacy-preserving blockchain
infrastructures such as [46–48].
Open problems. Since this work is the first attempt
of decentralizing data crowdsourcing atop the real-world
blockchain in a privacy-preserving way, the area remains
largely unexplored. Here we name a few open questions,
and we defer solutions to them in our future work. First,
there are many incentive mechanisms using reputation
systems, can we further extend our implementations to
support those incentives? Second, as the current smart con-
tract technology is at an infant stage and can only allow
very tiny on-chain storage, can we further optimize our
implementations for particular crowdsourcing tasks to assist
more large-scale tasks, e.g. to collect annotations for millions
of images (i.e. the scale of ImageNet dataset)? Third, our
anonymous protocol currently either relies on the under-
lying blockchain to support anonymous transaction, or re-
quires workers/requesters use one-time blockchain account
to submit data and receive reward. Can we design a (DApp-
layer) protocol to solve the drawbacks? Last but not least,
our protocol relies on a trusted registration authority (RA) to
establish identities. Although such a trusted RA could be a
reasonable assumption (in view of real-world experiences),
it is more tempting to develop an alternative methodology
to remove the third-party RA without sacrificing securities.
For example, can we adapt the successful invention of
proof-of-work to build up a crowdsourcing framework from
literally “zero” trust without any established identity?
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